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COMMUNITY

PROPERTY-DEFERRED

COMPENSATION:

OF MILITARY RETIRED PAY UPON DISSOLUTION OF

DISPOSITION

MARRIAGE-Payne

v. Payne, 82 Wn. 2d 573, 512 P.2d 736 (1973).
Petitioner-wife and respondent-husband were married a year
after he entered the military service, and divorced in Washington a
year before he became eligible to retire. In a property distribution
provision of its divorce decree, the trial court awarded the wife $65
per month of the $360 per month military retired pay' which the
husband expected to receive incident to his prospective retirement
from the United States Air Force. The court of appeals, reversing,
held that such an interest could not be distributed as property under a
divorce decree.2 The Washington Supreme Court, however, reinstated
the decree of the trial court, holding that an interest in military retired
pay and the anticipated future benefits therefrom are distributable as
property in a divorce proceeding. Payne v. Payne, 82 Wn. 2d 573,
512 P.2d 736 (1973).
After brief consideration of the pre-Payne cases, in which the
Washington Supreme Court diversely treated military retired pay in
the context of divorce, this note dissects the court's opinion in the
principal case. The court's holding in Payne is found to be based upon
inadequate analysis proceeding from a misunderstanding of the issue.
The precedential value of the case would have been significantly enhanced had the court provided a fully-reasoned analysis of the following issues:
(1) Is military retired pay property?
(2) To what extent is military retired pay community property?

1. "Military retired pay" will be used throughout this note to identify the federal
benefits paid to service personnel retired for age or length of service pursuant to

U.S.C. tit. 10 (1970). Retirement for physical disability under 10 U.S.C. ch. 61 (1970)
will not be discussed. Neither the service person nor the federal government makes
periodic contributions to any fund identifiable to the individual during the course of

active service. The following chapters of Title 10 set forth the circumstances under
which personnel may or must retire, and authorize monthly disbursements to one
so retired in an amount dependent upon length of service and retired grade (the
latter term usually equivalent to rate or rank at the time of separation from active
duty): Warrant officers of all services, chs. 63, 65, 69, 71; Army officer and enlisted

personnel, chs. 365, 367, 369, 371; Navy and Marine Corps officer and enlisted
personnel, cbs. 571, 573; Air Force officer and enlisted personnel, chs. 865, 867, 869, 871.
2. Payne v. Payne, 7 Wn. App. 338, 498 P.2d 882 (1972).
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(3) What disposition of military retired pay is appropriate upon
dissolution?
The note answers the first question in the affirmative, presents a mathematical solution to the second problem and identifies the factors to
be considered by a court in reaching an equitable resolution of the
third problem. The solutions suggested herein necessarily focus on the
particular characteristics of military retired pay. However, the property analysis propounded is of broader significance and of interest to a
wider readership because of its applicability to retirement plans generally.

I.

3

BACKGROUND-AN ERRATIC HISTORY

Inconsistency has marked the disposition of military retired pay in
Washington divorce proceedings. Addressing issues similar to that in
Payne, the Washington Supreme Court produced irreconcilable results
in three prior decisions, all involving former servicemen who were already receiving military retired pay. 4 In Loomis v. Loomis5 the trial
court had awarded the husband his military retired pay, "subject however to specific reservation of jurisdiction by this court to review and
to possibly change this award in any subsequent controversy between
the parties regarding alimony. '' 6 Remanding the case for reconsidera3. As one attorney observed:
While the opinion in Payne only discussed military retirement plans, its rationale
should apply a fortiori to retirement benefits from private corporations. Private
plans are more closely analogous to traditional property concepts, since they are
(I) funded and (2) not subject to annual Congressional appropriations or other
statutory variations.
Riddell. Three Special Problems: Retirement Plan Benefits, Child Support Beyond
Age 18, Interstate Enforcement, Modification Matters, in CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION CoNNLi.. WASIL SIAJE BAR ASS'N. CONVENTION 1973 (addendum at I) [hereinafter

cited as Riddell].
4. Loomis v. Loomis. 47 Wn. 2d 468, 288 P.2d 235 (1955); Morris v. Morris.
69 Wn. 2d 506, 419 P.2d 129 (1966); Roach v. Roach, 72 Wn. 2d 144, 432 P.2d
579 (1967). In addition, military retired pay has been involved in other Washington
decisions wherein its classification as property was not in issue. See, e.g., Weiss v. Weiss.
75 Wn. 2d 596. 452 P.2d 748 (1969) (although extensively argued in both parties*
briefs, the propriety of trial court's disposition of reserve retired pay as property was
not discussed by the supreme court): Morse v. Morse, 42 Wn. 2d 229, 254 P.2d 720
(1953) (military retired pay treated as resource bearing on husband's ability to pay
alimony).
5. 47 Wn. 2d 468. 288 P.2d 235 (1955).
6. Conclusion of Law IV, King County Superior Court No. 463185 (June 24, 1954).
quoted in Brief for Appellant at 19, Loomis v. Loomis. 47 Wn. 2d 468. 288 P.2d
235 (1955).
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tion of the property division and alimony award, the supreme court
indicated that military retired pay is divisible property, in that it "is
not in the nature of 'future earnings,' but is an asset acquired during
coverture ....

-7

The Washington court next considered military retired pay in
Morris v. Morris.8 In that case the trial court, treating the retired pay
as "a gratuity to the husband from the federal government and not a
community asset," 9 awarded it entirely to the retired serviceman. On
appeal, the supreme court quoted with approval the Loomis classification of the retired pay as divisible property, but announced:' 0
[i] t is not necessary at the present time to reach and dispose of the
problem as to the appropriate legal characterization or classification

7. 47 Wn. 2d at 479, 288 P.2d at 241. This indication that military retired pay
ought to be divided as property (and thus not subject to modification as alimony,
see notes 10, 20 & 25 infra) is not supported in the court's opinion by any discussion
which might disclose the underlying reasoning or analysis.
8. 69Wn. 2d506,419P.2d 129(1966).
9. Id. at 507, 419 P.2d at 130.
10. 69 Wn. 2d at 508-09, 419 P.2d at 131. The questionable validity of this conclusion is discussed in the text accompanying notes 39-42, 84-89 infra.
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.08.110 (1963) provides in pertinent part that when the
court determines that a divorce or annulment should be granted, it shall enter a
decree accordingly:
making such disposition of the property of the parties, either community or
separate, as shall appear just and equitable, having regard to the respective merits
of the parties, to the condition in which they will be left by such divorce or
annulment, to the party through whom the property was acquired, and to the
burdens imposed upon it for the benefit of the children ....

Such decree as to

alimony ... may be modified, altered and revised by the court from time to time
as circumstances may require. Such decree, however, as to . . . the custody,
management and division of property shall be final and conclusive upon both
parties subject only to the right to appeal as in civil cases ....
Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080 (Supp. 1973), which replaces the property
division portions of the above quoted statute and provides that under similar
circumstances:
the court shall, without regard to marital misconduct, make such disposition of
the property and the liabilities of the parties, either community or separate, as
shall appear just and equitable after considering all relevant factors including,
but not limited to:
(1) The nature and extent of the community property;
(2) The nature and extent of the separate property;
(3) The duration of the marriage; and
(4) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of
property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family
home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to a spouse having
custody of any children.
In discussing cases decided under the former statute, the terms "divorce" and "alimony"
will be retained; in other contexts, the terms "dissolution" and "maintenance"-appropriate under the curent statute-will be used.
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which should be accorded military pensions [because Washington law
subjects all] property of divorce litigants, whether it be separate or
community in nature, . . . to fair, reasonable and equitable disposition by the divorce court.
After expressing its disinclination to displace the trial court's judgment
in such a case and approving the trial court's decree as reasonable
and equitable, t" the court nevertheless reclassified the trial court's
12
alimony award of $125 per month, explaining:
However, in our opinion, the wife would have been provided more of
an element of security if the arrangements worked out by the trial
judge had given her an interest in a specific amount of the military
pension. Consequently, we have concluded that the wife should be
accorded an interest in the military pension in the specific amount of
$100 per month; that, in addition, she should be awarded $25 per
month alimony for a period of 5 years, all subject to further order of
the court, or until such time as she remarries or becomes employed
and earning $250 per month, or more.
The court's subsequent attempts to interpret this ambiguous expres-

sion 1 3 have produced incompatible results in Roach v. Roacht 4 and
Payne.

The Roach court reasoned that the language in Morris, "all subject
to further order of the court," 15 must logically refer to more than one
provision of the award, and that if the wife's interest in the retired pay
were thus subject to modification, the Morris court did not treat it as
property, despite having called it "an asset acquired during coverture."' 6 The court in Roach noted that military retired pay is subject to

11. 69 Wn. 2d at 509-10, 419 P.2d at 131. The Washington Supreme Court has
repeatedly asserted that it will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court
in divorce-related property dispositions unless the latter reflects a manifest abuse
of discretion. See, e.g., Thoren v. Thoren. 73 Wn. 2d 671, 440 P.2d 182 (1968). In
some cases, however, the court has responded to a showing of some discretionary
abuse (less than "manifest") by correcting the divorce decree to ameliorate or remove
the inequities fostered by it. DeRuwe v. DeRuwe, 72 Wn. 2d 404. 433 P.2d 209 (1967):
Stacy v. Stacy, 68 Wn. 2d 573, 414 P.2d 791 (1966).
12. 69 Wn. 2d at 510, 419 P.2d at 131-32 (emphasis added).
13. The equivocal manner in which the court expressed its order does not indicate
clearly whether in fact (rather than in form) the wife was awarded property in the
military retired pay, or alimony to be paid from it.
14. 72Wn. 2d 144,432P.2d579(1967).
15. 69 Wn. 2d at 510, 419 P.2d at 131-32 (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 508, 419 P.2d at 131.
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federal statutory contingencies, and declared that such pay "is not a
fixed asset but is an emolument or economic advantage of office. It is
an income resource which should be considered by the court in fixing
the amount of the alimony award."1 7 Consistent with this classification and with its interpretation of Morris, the Roach court supplemented the trial court's alimony award of $150 per month for 4 years
to provide that thereafter the former wife should receive "a 'specific
amount' of the military pension in the sum of $70 per month," subject
to several contingencies 8 and future modification by the court.19 This
decree-treating the retired pay only as a factor bearing on the alimony award-is clearly inconsistent with the court's earlier classification of military retired pay in Loomis as property. 20
II.

THE PAYNE DECISION

Faced with its erratic history of handling military retired pay, the
Washington Supreme Court should have welcomed Payne as an opportunity 2' to analyze carefully problems which it had ignored or
evaded in the past. However, after attempting to reconcile Loomis,
Morris and Roach, the Payne court addressed the wrong issue,
avoided some much-needed analysis and reached a conclusion which
22
has minimal precedential value.
At the time of the divorce and property disposition in Payne,23 the
husband was on active duty and not yet eligible to draw retired pay. 24
17. 72 Wn. 2d at 147, 432 P.2d at 581 (citation omitted).
18. The former wife was to receive $70 per month until she remarried or became
employed, earning $150 per month or more. 72 Wn. 2d at 147, 432 P.2d at 581.
19. Id. The trial court had made no disposition of the military retired pay.
20. Washington law clearly specifies that alimony awards are modifiable, whereas
the disposition of property is final. WASH. REV.CODE § 26.08.110 (1963), § 26.09.170
(Supp. 1973). See notes 10 supra & 130 infra.
21. A case could hardly be conceived that would be more amenable to a thorough
analysis of military retirement pay than Payne; the correctness of the divorce court's
disposition of retired pay was the sole issue on appeal.
22. Compare Fithian v. Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr.
369 (1974), in which the California Supreme Court considered California law settledwhich, as already noted, Washington law is not-with respect to property rights in
retirement benefits. Yet it carefully examined and resolved problems with proportional
ownership, enforcement, federal supremacy and the power of testation over the
nonearning spouse's share of the retirement benefits.
23. The Washington Supreme Court has previously recognized that it must consider the situation "as it existed at the time the divorce decree was entered." Edwards
v. Edwards, 74 Wn. 2d 286, 288, 444 P.2d 703, 704 (1968).
24. The supreme court quoted the language of the trial court's decree (entered
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Yet the issue was apparently mistaken, and definitely misstated, by the
supreme court: "In this divorce action the sole issue on appeal is
whether the trial court erred in awarding the wife a property interest
in her retired husband's military pension."2 5 By expressing the issue in
terms of an accrued property right, the court treated as distributable
property military retired pay which the serviceman had no present
right to receive. Since the previous decisions of the Washington court
involved husbands who were already drawing military retired pay at
the time of divorce, 26 the Payne court effected-without acknowledgment or explanation-a significant extension of prior case law.
The court recited from Loomis the classification of military retired
pay as " 'an asset acquired during coverture.' "27 The court then examined the Morris holding and dismissed the Roach court's interpretation 28 as a misconstruction. 29 Considering the contradictory classifica-

March 1. 1971) acknowledging the husband's anticipated "retirement in or about
April of 1972." 82 Wn. 2d at 575, 512 P.2d at 737.
25. 82 Wn. 2d at 574. 512 P.2d at 736 (emphasis added). The court of appeals'
articulation was more accurate: "The primary question presented by this appeal is
whether or not an interest in a military retirement program and future benefits
expected to be received thereunder constitute property distributable in a divorce
proceeding," 7 Wn. App. at 338, 498 P.2d at 882.
Washington appellate courts generally use the term "pension" instead of the correct
statutory language, "retired pay." See note I supra.
26. See cases cited in note 3 supra. All of the cases from other jurisdictions cited
by the Payne court involved servicemen retired at the time of divorce. Berkey v.
United States. 361 F.2d 983 (Ct. Cl. 1966): /n re Karlin. 24 Cal. App. 3d 25. 101
Cal. Rptr. 240 (1972): Kirkham v. Kirkham, 335 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
or separated from receipt of military retired pay only by the personal decision not to
retire. LeClert v. LeClert. 80 N.M. 235. 453 P.2d 755 (1969): Mora v. Mora. 429
S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
Not relied upon by the Payne court were two appellate court decisions which
divided property interests in retirement benefits for which the employee spouse was
tnqualified at the time of divorce. Part of a nonmilitary retirement plan was awarded
to the employee's spouse in the second hearing of DeRevere v. DeRevere. 5 Wn. App.
446, 488 P.2d 763, modified, 5 Wn. App. 741, 491 P.2d 249 (1971). The military
retired pay of a serviceman who was ineligible for retirement, but obligated to serve
sufficient time to qualify, was similarly treated in Miser v. Miser. 475 S.W.2d 597
(Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
27. 82 Wn. 2d at 575, 512 P.2d at 737.
28. See text accompanying notes 12-16 supra.
29. Apparently depreciating Roach because it was "a departmental decision.the Payne court attached controlling significance to the punctuation in Morris, rather
than to the use of the adjective "all." 82 Wn. 2d at 576. 512 P,2d at 737. Therefore.
the semicolon separating the $100 per month share of retired pay from the S25 per
month alimony award indicated to the Payne court that the former was being distributed as property and only the latter was subject to modification as alimony. Id. at
576, 512 P.2d at 738. This interpretation of Morris is more consonant than is the
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tions of military retired pay in Morris and Roach, and sharing the
former's preference for distribution as property, the Payne court might
well have been expected to overrule Roach. Instead it equivocated: 3 0
The statement in Roach that a military pension is 'not a fixed asset but
is an emolument or economic advantage of office' does not preclude
the court from treating certain aspects of that pension as property,
regardless of the fact that there are inherent limitations that make it
different from fixed assets.
Although that particular statement in Roach may not preclude the
court's treatment of military retired pay as property in Payne, the
clear disparity in treatment should have compelled a detailed discus31
sion of those "certain aspects of that pension [treatable] as property"
and the "inherent limitations" 32 of such treatment. Not feeling so
compelled, however, the court attempted to attenuate its earlier vacillations and simply concluded that military retired pay is "an earned
property right which accrues by reason of a specified number of years
of service in a particular branch of the armed services. ' 33 The court
observed that division of this right as property is consistent with other
34
community property states' treatment of military retired pay.
By using the device of conclusory labeling and consequent disposition, the court allowed taxonomy to replace reasoning and analysis as
the basis for its decision. Thorough analysis could have provided

Roach reading with the court's stated
greater security afforded by a property
However, the Payne court's conclusion
such consonance rather than upon a

objective in Morris to provide the wife the
division. 69 Wn. 2d at 510, 419 P.2d at 131.
in that regard should have been based upon
preference for divisive punctuation over an

inclusive adjective.
30. 82Wn.2dat576, 512 P.2d at 738.
31. Id. To the extent that a Washington practitioner must rely on this and previous
pronouncements of the state's highest court, "certain aspects" are neither certain, nor
named, nor even known.
32. Id.
33. 82 Wn. 2d at 577, 512 P.2d at 738. This statement overlooks the federal
statutory prerequisite of actual retirement to the accrual of a present, matured right
to military retired pay. See note 56 infra. However, the statement does suggest the
difficult problem of vesting which the court ignored. Compare Miser v. Miser, 475
S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972), in which the vesting problem was discussed
in the context of a similar factual situation.
34. Although other community property jurisdictions have approved this treatment
of military retired pay where the service person has retired or is eligible to retire at
the time of divorce, only one other court has yet done so where, as in Payne, the
service person is neither retired nor eligible to retire. See Miser v. Miser, 475 S.W.2d
597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
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much needed guidance for the future conduct of the bench, 35 bar 36
and spouses contemplating dissolution. The necessity for that guidance will become particularly acute if Washington's new dissolution
law 37 achieves one of its expected results: concurrence in property settlement agreements by a larger proportion of parties to impending dissolutions. 3 8 In order to negotiate such an agreement effectively, the
parties and their counsel must be able to ascertain with some confidence their respective interests in all assets-including military retired
pay-prior to dissolution. The Payne opinion, however, will not be
mistaken for cynosure. Thus, the remainder of this note is devoted to
illuminating the considerations which the court should have addressed.
III.

IS MILITARY RETIRED PAY PROPERTY?

The Washington Supreme Court has been unwilling to answer this
question plainly. Although in Payne the court held that retired pay
may be distributed as property, the unsupported assertion in Loomis
that such pay is "an asset acquired during coverture" 39 is as close as
the court has come to classifying it expressly. Nevertheless, classification is a prerequisite to any disposition. If the court does not classify
military retired pay as property, the statute 40 does not authorize its
disposition as property. If retired pay is classified as property, the
court must dispose of it in a dissolution (divorce) decree. 41 This classification should be accomplished uniformly so that it does not continue

35. Unaided by the inconsistency of the supreme court decisions referred to in
note 4 supra, it is not surprising that the court of appeals sought to fill the void of
uncertainty by declaring positively (prior to the supreme court's decision in Payne)
in Kinne v. Kinne, 7 Wn. App. 350, 355, 498 P.2d 887, 890 (1972): "[Our decision
in [Payinel lays to rest the contention that military retirement benefits constitute
property divisible by a divorce court." Accord, Mose v. Mose. 4 Wn. App. 204.
480 P.2d 517 (1971).
36. $100,000 was the price one attorney recently paid in a malpractice suit
involving his ignorance of this area of the law. Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530
P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975).
37. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 26.09 (Supp. 1973).
38. Id. § 26.09.070. See Rieke, The Dissolution Act of 1973: Fron Status to
Contract?, 49 WASH. L. REV. 375, 393-99 (1974). Professor Rieke, as Executive
Secretary of the Washington Judicial Council, was the principal draftsman of the
Washington version of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.
39. 47 Wn. 2d at 479, 288 P.2d at 241.
40.

WASH. REV. CODE §26.08.110 (1963).

41.

See Biehn v. Lyon, 29 Wn. 2d 750, 189 P.2d 482 (1948).
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to be treated in some cases only as income bearing on the amount 42of
maintenance (alimony) and in others as property subject to division.
Although Payne was intended to resolve the problem of uniform
determination, it did not:43 its holding is susceptible to at least three
44
inconsistent interpretations. Viewed as a response to the stated issue,
the Payne holding is limited to the proposition that the retired pay
being received by a service person already retired is property subject
to division by a dissolution court.4 5 However, the court's conclusion,

that military retired pay is "an earned property right which accrues by
reason of a specified number of years of service '46 indicates that the
retired pay of those who are eligible, but have not yet elected, to re42. But see Edwards v. Edwards, 74 Wn. 2d 286, 444 P.2d 703 (1968) (nonmilitary pension). It is possible, of course, that after specifically awarding military
retired pay to the service person as property, its effect on his or her ability to pay
maintenance (where appropriate) could be considered. Such consideration would not
be alternative to, but subsequent to, disposition of the retired pay as property.
43. But see Rieke, The Dissolution Act of 1973: From Status to Contract?,
49 WASH. L. REv. 375, 403-04 n.124 (1974), where the author states with reference
to Payne:
The Washington Supreme Court has recently reduced much of the confusion
[over how to classify retirement benefits] by holding that even a military pension,
though not available to the husband for another 13 months, was property which
could be divided.
44. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
45. That the court did not intend Payne to stand for any broader proposition is
suggested not only by its statement of the issue, but also by its failure to even
acknowledge the significant extension of prior holdings that would result from the
two interpretations which follow this note in the text.
46. 82 Wn.2d at 577, 512 P.2d at 738. Characterization of military retired pay
as deferred compensation for past services necessarily implies a rejection of two
competing characterizations: (1) as a gift or gratuity from the federal government
to the individual service person; and (2) as contemporaneous compensation for
duties or obligations of the service person after retirement. Implicit in the concept of
a gift or gratuity is an element of discretion in the donor; he is not obliged to give.
By contrast, the federal statutes delineate certain requirements, the completion of
which entitles the service person to military retired pay. The ever-present power of
Congress to alter or eliminate these statutory provisions does not make a gratuity of
the entitlements which arise while the statutes continue in effect. In re Karlin, 24
Cal. App. 3d 25, 101 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1972).
The principal burden on a retiree is his susceptibility to recall in case of war or
national emergency. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 6481-82 (1970). However, should recall
occur, the retiree (like the many nonretirees who would likewise be called to serve
under such circumstances) will be fully compensated for service based upon the then
current active duty rates of pay. While awaiting such a recall, the retiree (unlike a
reservist) is not required to perform periodic drills in order to maintain the acuity
of martial skills. See French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941).
Thus, the court's characterization of military retired pay as deferred compensation
is more consistent with the nature of the pay than are the notions of gratuity or
compensation for future services. See Comment, Tire Unsettled Question of the
Military Pension: Separate or Community Property?, 8 CAL. W.L. REV. 522, 525-28
(1972).
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tire is also divisible as property. Finally, the broadest interpretation
of Payne is derived from application of the result to the facts of the
case itself: Military retired pay is property even when a right to it has
not been earned by the statutory minimum period of service.
A.

Vesting

In Washington, the concept of property has ample elasticity to include even the broadest or exclude all but the narrowest interpretations of Payne. The Washington court has described property as -a
term of broad significance, embracing everything that has exchangeable
value, and every interest or estate which the law regards of sufficient
value for judicial recognition.- 47 The question must then be asked:
When does an interest in military retired pay attain "sufficient value
for judicial recognition"? If a service person's life is represented by a
time line, several possible answers are identifiable:
a

Entry into
service

b

Contract
to serve at
least to "c"

c

d

Statutory
minimum service
48

e

Retirement

Death

for retirement

From entry into the service (a) until actual retirement (d), retired pay
is being earned. 49 Beginning at retirement, an interest in military
retired pay can be described as "matured," i.e., there is a present right
to receive the pay. 50 At the service person's election, this right to receive retired pay may commence immediately upon completion of

47. York v. Stone, 178 Wash. 280. 285. 34 P.2d 911. 913 11934). quoted with
approval. Lee & Eastes, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 52 Wn. 2d 701, 704. 328 P.2d
700, 702 (1958) (declaring right to operate a business to be property).
48. Although periodic contracts define the service obligations of all enlisted
personnel (see, e.g., U.S. NAVY. BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL MANUAL, arts.
1040100-1050300 (1969)), they are inapplicable to a large number of officers who
serve "at the pleasure of the President.- E.g., id., arts. 3830340, 3830220.
49. In most cases. a service person's retired pay will be 2,'2% of active duty
base pay (at retired grade) for each year of active duty service completed: e.g., 50%
at 20 years service, and 75% at 30 years. After 30 years of service the dollar amount
of retired pay may increase with advancement in grade, but the proportion of active
duty pay receivable will remain 75%. 10 U.S.C. chs. 371. 571. 573, 871 (1970) &
ch. 71 (Supp. 11, 1972).
50. See statutes cited note I supra.
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the statutory minimum service for retirement (c), 51 but in any event
52
the right will be extinguished at his death (e).
The point of demarcation between classification as an expectancy
and judicial recognition as property may be termed "vesting."5 3 Each
of the proffered interpretations of Payne5 4 would locate vesting at a
different point along the time line. The first and narrowest alternative
would regard vesting as coincident with actual retirement (point d on
the time line).55 Although such a view is arguably most consistent with
the federal statutory language,5 6 it has been judicially rejected in those
57
jurisdictions which have confronted the vesting problem.

5 1. Twenty years' service is frequently the statutory minimum for retirement.
10 U.S.C. chs. 65, 367, 571, 867 (1970). But see 10 U.S.C. chs. 63, 365, 573, 865
(1970), providing for retirement upon the attainment of specified ages.
52. Service personnel may personally elect to receive a reduced amount of retired
pay in order to provide an annuity after death for a surviving (not former) spouse.
10 U.S.C. §§ 1431-55 (Supp. II, 1972).
53. See H. Cross, Community Property 83 (1973) (mimeographed materials in
University of Washington Law Library). Prior to such time, the expectancy cannot
be awarded as property; after that time the vested interest must be so awarded. See
text accompanying notes 40-41 supra. This definition of "vesting" is intentionally
altered from the meaning it frequently bears with respect to more conventional forms
of property: that time when the right to present or future possession or enjoyment
becomes fixed and alienable. This more general definition is inapplicable to military
retired pay to which rights are arguably never fixed, even after the service person's
retirement. "It is obvious that Congress may grant, increase, or decrease benefits
subject to the due process limitations against patently arbitrary action, utterly lacking in
rational justification." Hoffman v. Dodd, 331 F. Supp. 393, 394 (N.D. Ill. 1971)
(involving the Railroad Retirement Act). See Goodley v. United States, 441 F.2d
1175 (Ct. Cl. 1971); .Abbott v. United States, 287 F.2d 573 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 915 (1961); cf. Bell v. United States, 366 U.S. 393 (1961) (entitlement to military pay statutory, not contractual); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603
(1960) (no vested right to social security payments terminated when Congress
changed statutes); Stouper v. Jones, 284 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (no vested right
to civil service annuity terminated by change in statute, although mandatory contributions had been made by claimant to the retirement fund). The federal reluctance
to recognize vested interests is in marked contrast to Washington's adherence to the
"'contract of employment-vested right' theory relative to public pension systems."
Weaver v. Evans, 80 Wn. 2d 461, 475, 495 P.2d 639, 648 (1972).
The inequities which may result from determinations based on the vested-unvested
dichotomy have been decried by many commentators. See, e.g., Comment, The
Identification and Division of Intangible Community Property: Slicing the Invisible
Pie, 6 U.C.D.L. REv. 26, 28-32 (1973).
54. See text accompanying notes 43-46 supra.
55. The service persons in previous cases considered by the Washington Supreme
Court would come within this narrowest view of vesting. See cases cited note 4 supra.
56. If federal statutes ever recognize a vested right to military retired pay, see
note 53 supra, it is only after the service person has actually retired. Retired pay is
not described as accruing with years of service, but as being payable after retirement
in amounts computed with reference to length of service. See statutes cited note I supra.
57. Typical of the judicial attitude is the response of a California court to a
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Most community property jurisdictions, unwilling to defer vesting
until the serviceman's retirement, have settled upon the second suggested interpretation of Payne: that vesting occurs upon completion of
the minimum service required by statute for retirement (point c on the
time line). 58 This rule recognizes that a service person has at that time
acquired a statutory right to receive military retired pay. conditioned
only upon the voluntary election to retire. In Miser v. Miser/ 9 a
Texas appellate court extended this rule somewhat to treat retired pay
as vested when a serviceman had contractually obligated himself
to complete the statutory minimum service for retirement (point b on
the time line). With divorce occurring 18 months prior to eligibility
for retirement, the facts of Miser were very similar to those of Payne
(where the divorce occurred 13 months prior to the husband's eligibility for retirement).
Although the Miser court expressly limited its holding to the partic-

serviceman who, at the time of his divorce, was eligible to retire but had not elected
to do so:
[T] he only condition to the payment of pension benefits is a condition entirely
within Major Bensing's control and this is not the type of uncertainty which
precludes division upon divorce .... [If it were.] a spouse could be deprived of
any share of matured pension rights by the decision of the employee to delay
retirement until after the divorce proceedings were concluded.
Bensing v. Bensing, 25 Cal. App. 3d 889, 893, 102 Cal. Rptr. 255, 257 (1972).
One unsuccessful argument in support of this alternative was that a right to the
receipt of military retired pay is contingent upon the service person's neither dying nor
being dishonorably discharged before actual retirement. A Texas court, unconvinced,
decided that those contingencies "merely make his [or her] interest subject to
divestment. It is, nevertheless, a property interest and not a mere expectancy."
Mora v. Mora, 429 S.W.2d 660, 662 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). See Bensing v. Bensing.
supra; Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970) (disability retirement pay was
treated the same as voluntary military retired pay; however, a strongly worded
dissent would not have recognized a vested right until actual retirement). New Mexico
also rejected actual retirement as a condition for the vesting of a property interest
in military retired pay in LeClert v. LeClert. 80 N.M. 235, 453 P.2d 755 (1969).
That case, however, involved the additional factor that the serviceman, still on active
duty, had received orders directing his retirement 4 months after the divorce.
In another context, the U.S. Tax Court based a retirement income credit ruling in
favor of a retired serviceman and his wife on its opinion that a vested interest in
military retired pay could not be acquired prior to actual retirement. Wilkerson v.
Commissioner, 44 T.C. 718 (1965), aff'd per curiam, 368 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1966).
The Tax Court's concept of vesting was criticized in Lay, Retirement Income Credit
and Community Property: A Problem of Vesting, 42 TUE. L. REv. 304 (1968).
58. See cases cited note 57 supra. The California Supreme Court recently indicated
its approval of this vesting rule for military retired pay. The statement was by way
of dictum, however, because the husband, already retired, had conceded his interest
in the retired pay to be vested. Fithian v. Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449.
11ICal. Rptr. 369 (1974).
59. 475 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
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ular circumstances of that case, two subsequent Texas decisions have
illustrated the difficulty of establishing a clearly-defined, unwavering
line of demarcation called vesting. In re Marriage of McCurdy6° involved a nonmilitary retirement plan under which the employee would
not be entitled to receive any benefits unless he remained with the
company until his retirement late in 1977. Nevertheless, both the divorce court (apparently motivated by the employee's completion of
141/3 years of service) and the Texas appellate court recognized a
property interest as if it had vested in 1972.61 Davis v. Davis62 involved military retired pay which another Texas divorce court treated
as property subject to division in 1971, although the serviceman had
years of service and would not be eligible to retire
only completed 8
until 1983. In reversing, the same appellate court which had decided
Miser reiterated its limitation of the latter case to its peculiar facts and
renewed its allegiance to the vesting requirement approved by the
63
Texas Supreme Court:
[T] he interest of a serviceman in his military retirement benefits becomes a vested property right and community property subject to be
divided by a court in a divorce action only when the required statutory period of time has come about during the marriage relationship
even though the election of the serviceman to retire separates him
from actual payment.
64
To some, this vesting rule-embraced by the courts of California
as well as Texas--deserves not allegiance, but abandonment. One
critic predicted that a trial court adjudicating a divorce action involving a serviceman nearly eligible to retire, "probably would be
tempted to go through some procedural stretching to achieve a just
result.' ' 5 Faced with just such a situation, the Washington court over-

60. 489 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
61. In affirming, the appellate court professed to rely on Webster v. Webster, 442
S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), secondarily citing Miser and Williamson v.
Williamson, 457 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). However, most of its inspiration

must have been drawn from Miser, since the other two cases involved employees who
had already completed the minimum service required for retirement at the time of
their divorces.
62.

495 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).

63.

Id. at 613.

64.

See, e.g., Fithian v. Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr.

369(1974).
65. Note, Retirement Pay: A Divorce in Time Saved Mine, 24 HASTINGS LJ.
347, 353 (1973).
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looked the problem in Payne, while the Texas court in Miser contrived an exception to its vesting rule to accommodate the facts of that
case. 66 Consideration of Payne and the trio of Texas cases as a group
suggests that once a court forsakes the rule of vesting at the time of
eligibility for retirement, the point at which judicial recognition ought
67
to occur is not clear.

B.

The Consequences of Choosing a Discrete Point of Vesting

The direct result of selecting a point after which an interest in military retired pay shall be judicially recognized as property is that if dissolution should occur before that time, no part of the interest can be
distributed as property. 68 Thus, the nonemployee spouse will be deprived of a community share of deferred compensation for services
performed during the existence of the community. 69 This result is
contrary to the basic tenet of community property law that compensation for either spouse's services accrues to the benefit of the commu-

66. See text accompanying note 59 supra. That exception would not, however.
pertain if Mi.ser had not been an enlisted man, but an officer whose continuance in
service did not depend on successive contracts, Achievement of the same result might
then have required a more artificial and arbitrary acceleration of vesting. Not only
would such a concession to appealing equities be more difficult to rationalize, but
desirable dimensions of the compromise are not readily ascertainable.
67. The uncertainty of one writer is illustrative:
Once the vested-unvested barrier is broken (judicially or legislatively), a problem
of line drawing also has to be solved. Any right less than half earned should
undoubtedly not be considered. But after that, what is the best place at which
to begin to recognize the spouse's interest? There is no simple answer, but the
inequity of allowing the non-employee spouse no share of a benefit that is very
likely to vest in a year or two should not be allowed to continue.
Comment, The Identification and Division of Intangible Commlnitv Property: Slicing
the Invi,ible Pie, 6 U.C.D.L. REv. 26, 32 (1973). Query whether it is really clear that
a right less than half earned "should undoubtedly not be considered"?
68. The wife might be awarded maintenance, and the husband could use retired
pay as a resource from which to make maintenance payments. The amount of
maintenance, however, would depend upon the wife's future needs, not upon her past
contribution to the community during the years the retired pay was being earned.
See text accompanying notes 134-35 infra.
69. A California court of appeals recently recognized the inequities of this result.
but reluctantly conceded its obligation to follow "the new well-settled rule that
pension benefits which will mature in futuro are mere expectancies." until that rule is
"reconsidered by higher authority." In re Marriage of Wilson. 32 Cal. App. 3d
546. 108 Cal. Rptr. 371, 374 (1973). Vacating the court of appeals decision while
repeating its result verbatim, the California Supreme Court declined the court of
appeals' invitation to reconsider the vesting question because the petitioning wife
had not properly preserved the issue on appeal. In re Marriage of Wilson. 10 Cal.
3d 851, 519 P.2d 165, 112 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1974).
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nity.7 0 The potential inequities are evident from a consideration of
representative marital communities, each of 18 years' duration. 7 1 A
determination that vesting occurs at any designated point later than
the inception of service72 precludes division of retired pay as property
in those marital communities-all contributing 18 years to securing
the benefit-which terminate prior to that point. In particular, if
vesting is determined to occur only after 20 years of service, none of
the military retired pay earned by a marital community spanning the
first 18 years of service would be regarded as property subject to disposition at the time of divorce. 73 However, even a short-lived community beginning in the 19th year of military service and terminating
after the 20th could be entitled to some share of the retired pay, con74
sidered property at the time of dissolution.

70. See Friedlander v. Friedlander, 58 Wn. 2d 288, 362 P.2d 352 (1961);
W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY §66 (2d ed. 1971).
Community property is statutorily defined in WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030 (Supp.
1973) as property acquired during marriage by either spouse, except that property
defined as separate in id. §§ 26.16.010-.020 (1963). Separate property includes all
property brought into the marriage by either spouse or lucratively acquired (i.e., by
gift, bequest, devise or descent) during the marriage, plus all proceeds from such
property.
71. Eighteen years was the length of the Payne marriage. Brief for Respondent
at 3, Payne v. Payne, 7 Wn. App. 338, 498 P.2d 882 (1972). The reader may find
useful the following graphical depiction of those representative 18-year marital
communities:
,

Ex. 5

Ex. 4
Ex. 3

-NEx. 2
Ex. I

a

Entry into
service

b

Contract
to serve
at least
to c

c

d

Statutory
minimum
service for
retirement

e
Retirement

Death

Note that Example 3 represents the chronological sequence in Payne and Miser.
72. Point a on the graph, note 71 supra.
73. If vesting is deemed to occur at point c on the graph, note 71 supra, military
retired pay will be property distributable at the dissolution of the marital communities
depicted as Examples 4 and 5; the retired pay in Examples 1, 2 and 3 will not be
distributable as property.
74. Or consider the disparate treatment of two marriages, each of 10 years'
duration, one commencing the year before the service person's career begins, the
other ending the year after retirement (and vesting) at 20 years. The former is the
"less than half earned" right which one author finds unworthy of consideration in her
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A Suggested Rule of Immediate Vesting

Such potential inequities will be eliminated only if military retired
pay is considered vested when service begins. Although the third view
of Payne75 may be construed specifically to regard military retired pay
as property within 13 months of being fully earned, it is also susceptible of this broader interpretation: That retired pay is of "sufficient
value for judicial recognition" 7 6 as property whether a dissolution
occurs before or after retirement is earned or elected. Consider the
consequences with respect to an even more extreme example than the
18-year marriages: The identical contributions and interests of two
marital communities of short duration-three years, for examplespanning the first and last portions of a 20-year military career could
be similarly rewarded, for the retired pay would be property subject to
disposition in both cases.
The last example, however, suggests several grounds for objection:
(1) the length of time before military retired pay might actually be
received; (2) the uncertainty of retired pay ever being fully earned or
received; and (3) the apparently small community interest involved
even if a right to retired pay does eventually mature. In response to
these objections, some who favor immediate vesting have offered an
77
analogy to life insurance.
In the case of life insurance, after a short marriage many years'
premiums will usually remain to be paid if the insurance is to be in
force and the proceeds payable when the policy matures (upon the
death of the insured); likewise, many years' service must be rendered
to fully earn the right to military retired pay, which will mature upon
the retirement of the service person. If required premiums are not paid or
services not rendered during those years following dissolution, neither
proceeds nor retired pay will be received. Thus, both rights can be
concern for those whose benefits are "very likely to vest [for vest, read "'be fully
earned"] in a year or two." Comment, The Identification and Division of Intangible
Community Property: Slicing the Invisible Pie, 6 U.C.D.L. REv. 26, 32 (1973).
Certainly the equities of the latter seem stronger. But when recognition as property
(vesting) is moved to a point two years earlier to include the interests of the latter
group, a new group of borderline cases will present apparently irresistable equities:
and the process continues until vesting at last coincides with inception of service.
75. See text following note 46 supra.
76. York v. Stone, 178 Wash. 280, 285, 34 P.2d 911, 913 (1934), quoted, text
accompanying note 47 supra.
77. Note, Retirement Pay: A Divorce in Time Saved Mine, 24 HASTINGS LJ.
347,355 (1973).
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considered vested, subject to defeasance if those conditions necessary
to maintain or fully earn the right to present enjoyment of the benefits
78
are not fulfilled.
It should also be observed-and will be discussed below-that
although the community's proportionate interest in both the life
insurance proceeds and the military retired pay continue to decrease as noncommunity funds or labor are added after dissolution,
they do not necessarily become insignificant.79 Not the long wait, nor
the uncertainty, nor the decreasing proportionate community interest
has prevented Washington courts from recognizing an interest in life

insurance proceeds as community property.8 0 Neither have these factors
prevented Washington courts from embracing the rule of immediate
vesting with respect to both nonfederal public retirement plans8 1 and
noncontributory corporate plans.8 2 Both reason and equity favor
similar treatment of military retired pay.8 3 But if the Payne court was

78. The insured's eventual death is obviously certain; not certain is his death while
the policy is yet in force. The corresponding element rendering military retired pay
due is the service person's actual retirement; once retired pay is earned, this event
becomes not a certainty (death or dishonorable discharge could intervene), but
nearly so. Thus, if the benefit in each case is not fully earned, the occurrence of the
event potentially triggering payment is immaterial. On the other hand, if the benefits
are fully earned, receipt of life insurance proceeds is certain, while receipt of retired
pay is extremely probable.
79. The community interest in military retired pay should seldom become too
small for judicial recognition. Even in the case of a community lasting only 3 of the
military career's 20 years, the community interest would be 3/20 or 15%. If the
service person retired at age 40 with monthly retired pay of $360, as in Payne, and
lived until age 70, the other spouse's interest could be computed as follows:
X 15% X $360 per month X 30 years X 12 months per year = $9720. The
entire community interest-$19,440--even when actuarially reduced to dissolutiondate value, would be a significant item in most marital communities.
For a discussion of this computation, see note 98 infra. That discussion mentions
the need to account for portions of the marriage within and without community
property jurisdictions; the above example assumes that in the case of a marriage only
enduring for 3 years, the spouses might well have lived in a community property
jurisdiction throughout.
80. After two hearings and what must be presumed considerable contemplation
of the vesting problem, the Washington Court of Appeals relied on an insurance
analogy to support its determination that an employee had a vested interest-hence
property-in a noncontributory corporate retirement plan (under which the employee
was not yet qualified for any benefits) "from the date of its inception." DeRevere v.
DeRevere, 5 Wn. App. 741, 743, 491 P.2d 249, 251, rehearing 5 Wn. App. 446,
488 P.2d 763 (1971).
81. See, e.g., Leonard v. Seattle, 81 Wn. 2d 479, 503 P.2d 741 (1972); Bakenhus
v. Seattle, 48 Wn. 2d 695, 296 P.2d 536 (1956).
82. DeRevere v. DeRevere, 5 Wn. App. 741, 491 P.2d 249 (1971).
83. Professor Lay favors abolishing any rule of vesting coincident with either
actual retirement or eligibility therefor. He suggests that either abolishment of the
vesting requirement or its practical equivalent-vesting at the commencement of
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not prepared to extend that vesting rule to military retired pay, it
nevertheless should have responded with some unambiguous indication
of when retired pay is property. A court, counsel or couple considering
a dissolution must know when it is necessary and appropriate to proceed to the next question.
IV.

TO WHAT EXTENT IS MILITARY RETIRED PAY
COMMUNITY PROPERTY?

The dissolution court's equity power has sufficient scope to permit
an award of all or any part of the community property or of one
spouse's separate property to the other. 84 That all property of the parties is subject to the disposition of the court,8 5 however, does not absolve the court of its duty to effect the division with due regard for the
source and character of the property.8 6 Even if the statute did not
command the court to consider the parties' predissolution property
interests, such an awareness is necessary for the "just and equitable"
disposition which is required. 87 Moreover, characterization of propservice--would be as conceptually rational as the criticized rules and would produce
superior results. Lay, Retirement Income Credit and Community Property: A Problem
of Vesting, 42 TUL. L. REV. 304, 319 (1968).
Recognition of immediate vesting would not compel courts to award one spouse an
interest in military retired pay of the other. It would merely make such an award
possible when the facts of the case make it desirable, so that the community contribution may be accorded recognition regardless of when it happened to occur during
the course of a military career.
84. See Part V-A supra. Only in exceptional circumstances, however, should a
court award to one spouse part or all of the other's separate property. See, e.g.,
Merkel v. Merkel, 39 Wn. 2d 102, 234 P.2d 857 (1951); Bodine v. Bodine, 34 Wn. 2d
33,207 P.2d 1213 (1949).
85. Patrick v. Patrick, 43 Wn. 2d 139, 260 P.2d 878 (1953).
86. See, e.g., Baker v. Baker, 80 Wn. 2d 736, 498 P.2d 315 (1972); Blood v.
Blood, 69 Wn. 2d 680, 419 P.2d 1006 (1966), and cases cited therein.
87. The statute controlling in Payne, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.08.110 (1963), see note
10 supra, appeared to require the dissolution court to consider the character of the
property owned by the parties. The current statute specifically directs the court to
consider: "(1) [t] he nature and extent of the community property; (2) [t]he nature
and extent of the separate property ....
."WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080 (Supp. 1973);
see note 10 supra.
The disparity in decisions of the Washington Court of Appeals on this issue under
the former statute reflected the need for a consistent, well-defined approach by the
supreme court. Compare In re Marriage of Melville, II Wn. App. 879, 526 P.2d
1228 (1974) (characterization of property not controlling, but one of many factors
to consider); Pollock v. Pollock, 7 Wn. App. 394, 499 P.2d 231 (1972) (court must
have in mind correct status of property); Belmondo v. Belmondo, 3 Wn. App. 958.
480 P.2d 786 (1970) (court may consider source of property); Peterson v. Peterson.
3 Wn. App. 374, 475 P.2d 576 (1970) (items of property need not be labeled, but
court must have in mind correct character).
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erty by the court provides at least two other benefits: (1) It supplies

the present parties and their counsel with information essential to the
determination of tax consequences; 8 8 and (2) it indicates to future or

potential parties and their counsel how the court would characterize
their property, thus discouraging repetitious litigation and encouraging solution by means of a settlement agreement. 89
A. The "Inception of Right" Doctrine
Conceptual consistency dictates that interests in deferred compensation should be treated like interests in other earnings and gains acquired through the labor and industry of either spouse during mar-

riage.90 Thus, military retired pay is community property only if the
marital community existed at the time property in the retired pay was
acquired.9 1 The strict application of this inception of right doctrine
would result in characterization of military retired pay as either
entirely separate property or entirely community property-regardless
of the duration of the community and its contribution to earning the

benefit-depending only upon marital status at the time rights in the
92
benefit are deemed to be acquired.

88. Where both community and separate property is before the court, the tax
consequences may vary significantly depending upon the parties' respective pre- and
postdissolution interests. See Victor, Divorce and Deferred Compensation Arrangeinents, U. So. CAL. 1972 TAX INST. 471; Hjorth, Community Property Marital
Settlements: The Problem and a Proposal,50 WASH. L. REV. 231 (1975).
89. A mutual recognition of their predissolution property interests may be crucial
if the parties or their counsel are to be successful in avoiding litigation of the property
disposition by means of a settlement agreement. Where such interests are uncertain,
each party is likely to believe that his or her interest is greater than it actually is;
the resulting hiatus will prolong, and may preclude, a settlement. Failure to achieve
agreement will frequently be unfortunate, because the flexibility and planning
potential of such a settlement can often produce results far more favorable to both
parties than the court's disposition. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.070 (Supp. 1973);
Rieke, The Dissolution Act of 1973: From Status to Contract?, 49 WASH. L. REV.
375, 393-406(1974).
90. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
91. That property is characterized as community or separate as of the time of its
acquisition is well settled in Washington. See, e.g., Baker v. Baker, 80 Wn. 2d 736,
745, 498 P.2d 315, 320 (1972) and cases cited therein. Acquisition of property in
military retired pay might be deemed coincident with any of the vesting points
considered in Part III supra.
92. The Washington court has encountered some difficulty in deciding whether
certain types of property should be characterized according to the inception of right
doctrine ("mortgage rule") or the proportionate ownership doctrine ("life insurance
rule") discussed infra. See Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington,
49 WASH. L. REV. 729, 755-63 (1974).
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B. A PreferableApproach: ProportionateOwnership
1.

Military retired pay generally
93

The severity of an "all or nothing" characterization of the property
under the inception of right doctrine is frequently avoided by the
4
application of proportionate ownership principlesY
Under the proportionate ownership doctrine, the community interest should be that proportion of the entire retired pay expressed by
95
the following equation:

{

domiciled in a community prop-

(i

community interest in
military retired pay

years of military service while

=

retired
pay

x erty jurisdiction during
marriage
/\total
years in military service

/

If the service person has not yet retired, the denominator is necessarily
variable, increasing with the additional years or months of service
93. The substantial potential for inequity is illustrated by the facts of Wilkerson v.
Commissioner, 44 T.C. 718 (1965), affd per curiain, 368 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1966).
criticized, Lay, Retirement Income Credit and Community Property: A Problem of
Vesting, 42 TUL. L. REV. 304, 317-19(1968).
94. If the military retired pay is separate property because no marriage existed at
the time a right to it was acquired, the community is nonetheless entitled to reimbursement to the extent that community labor earned the retired pay. Conversely. if
the benefit is community property because a right thereto was deemed to be acquired
during marriage, the service person is entitled to similar contribution in proportion
to the separate labor supplied. The applicability of this concept to the disposition of
military retired pay is well established in California. New Mexico and Texas. See
Fithian v. Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974):
LeClert v. LeClert, 80 N.M. 235, 453 P.2d 755 (1969); Mora v. Mora, 429 S.W.2d
660 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). Washington has applied such a tracing principle to
apportion ownership interests in life insurance proceeds according to the community
or separate character of the premiums. Small v. Bartyzel, 27 Wn. 2d 176, 177 P.2d
391 (1947); In re Coffey's Estate. 195 Wash. 379, 81 P,2d 283 (1938). Years of
community and separate service which earn military retired pay are analogous to
community and separate funds used to pay insurance premiums. See text accompanying notes 77-83 supra.
The applicability of the proportionate ownership doctrine to nonfederal statutory
retirement plans is inherent in Washington's concept of the benefits as being continuously and incrementally acquired over the entire term of service or employment.
Leonard v. Seattle, 81 Wn. 2d 479, 503 P.2d 741 (1972). Tembruell v. Seattle. 64
Wn. 2d 503, 392 P.2d 453 (1964). Thus, the portion of benefits "acquired" during
marriage is generally community property, because earned with a community asset.
the spouse's labor. The share acquired outside of marriage is separate property.
95. The fraction is expressed in units of time because they are a direct measure
of the community contribution. Some courts have preferred to compare years of
service, Webster v. Webster, 442 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969). while others
have used months. Mora v. Mora, 429 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
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which fully earn or increase the value of military retired pay.9 6 The
obvious disadvantage of being unable to solve this equation until actual retirement can be overcome by substituting an equivalent fraction
based upon the active base pay-not retired pay-for the service person's grade at the time of dissolution. 97 The following equation, incorporating this substitution, yields a value which will remain constant
despite additional service performed after dissolution:98
comunit
military retired pay

.s
in

military base)

years of military service
while domiciled in a com-

dissolution

during marriage

40)
96. This method was adopted in a case purportedly decided on the basis of
inception of right, not the proportionate ownership doctrine. Williamson v. Williamson,
457 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). There the wife was awarded a share of
nonmilitary retirement benefits equal to 13/26 of the total benefits if her employeehusband should retire at the time of the divorce (after 26 years of employment).
The court stipulated that her enjoyment of these benefits should be postponed to
coincide with his, after actual retirement. Her share would then be a fraction with a
numerator of 13 and a denominator equal to the total years of employment which
earned the benefits. The variable denominator feature was applied to the division of
military retired pay in Miser v. Miser, 475 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
The denominator should be limited to that period of service after which the value
of military retired pay is no longer increased-usually at 30 years, since retired pay
is equal to 21/% of base pay for each year's service, but limited to 75%. See note
49 supra.
97. The community's share of the military retired pay should be based upon the
service person's grade at the time of dissolution. (A specific pay grade is associated
with each rate or rank in the military structure.) The community is not entitled to any
increase in the value of retired pay due to subsequent promotions presumably earned
by separate labor. While there is little doubt that a service person's prior performance
influences his/her chances of promotion, the incalculable relationship would not
justify awarding a spouse who divorced a lieutenant, for example, a share of military
retired pay based on the rank of general 20 or 30 years later. To point out that the
spouse had to wait many years for a share only reaffirms that deferred compensation
is indeed deferred. The service person's share is much inflated, not because of the
wait to collect it, but because of the considerable separate time and effort contributed
towards its enhanced value since the dissolution.
98. The dollar amount of retired pay (and its percentage of base pay) increases
with continued service as the community interest fraction decreases after dissolution.
Because of this inverse relationship between the variable fraction representing the
community interest and the general formula used by the military for computing
retired pay, the community's share, expressed as a fraction of base pay (instead of
retired pay) at dissolution, remains constant after dissolution.
The interrelationship may be observed more accurately if the formulae are
expressed as follows:
Let: C = the community interest in military retired pay;
W = the nonearning spouse's interest in military retired pay;
y = years of married service in a community property jurisdiction;
z = years of military service;
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Changes of domicile
In either of the above equations, only service performed while the

married couple is domiciled in a community property jurisdiction
enhances the community interest. Washington courts have long recog-

m = military retired pay; and
b = base pay.
It has already been established that
y
C =
X m (see formula in text following note 95 supra).
z
and that
m=22 % XzX b
zb
=(see note 55 supra).
40
Combining these formulae,
y
zb

C

=-X-

z
40
y
=-b.
40
Furthermore, since
I
y
W =-C,
thenW =-b.
2
80
An example may be helpful. If 10 years of a 15-year marriage were spent in a
community property state during the last portion of a 20-year military career, we know:
10
1
C =X m =m, and
20
2
20
1
m =21/2
X 20 X b=-b=--b.
40
2
Thus, C =

22

X b

=

4

b.

In words, the community's interest is one-half the total military retired pay because
it existed (and contributed) during one-half the years retired pay was being earned.
But retired pay is one-half base pay after 20 years' service. Therefore, the community
interest in retired pay is equal to one-fourth of base pay.
Using the same facts with respect to a 30-year career, we find that
10
1
C = - m = - m; but now,
30
3
30
3
m = 2/2% X30x b=-b=-b.
40
4
1
3
1
Thus, C =--- x b =-b.
3
4
4
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nized that the characterization of property as community or separate
-- controlled by the law of the domicile at the time of acquisitionsurvives a subsequent change of domicile.9 9 Like the courts of other
community property jurisdictions, however, they have overlooked or

avoided the probable choice of law problem in most decisions characterizing and apportioning assets of transient marital communities. 10 0
In Colpe v. Lindblom, the Washington Supreme Court stated: "In the
absence of evidence as to the domicile of the parties at the time the
money was earned, the presumption will be indulged that the domicilNow the community has a smaller share of retired pay whose value, both absolute
and as a function of base pay, has increased; but the community's interest in retired
pay is still equal to one-fourth of base pay.
Similar formulae can be derived to provide a dissolution-date value for the respective
interests in other noncontributory retirement plans whose benefits like military retired
pay, increase lineally as a function of years of employment. As an example, consider
the retirement plan in DeRevere v. DeRevere, 5 Wn. App. 446, 447, 488 P.2d 763,
764 (1971), wherein the annual amount of the employee's pension was computed
"by multiplying his years of service by one per cent of the average of his five highest
annual salaries." In this corporate context, the formula for the community's interest
is based upon the average salary for the employee's 5 highest-paid years prior to
dissolution (or fewer, if employed or married fewer than 5 years), analogous to the
base pay for the service person's grade at dissolution. Using the symbols introduced
above,
y
zb
C = - X m, and, m = 1% X z X b = -.
Therefore,
z
100
y
y
C =b, and, W =b.
100
200
If 40 of Mr. DeReyere's "more than 40 years," id., of employment occurred while he
was married and domiciled in Washington, and the average salary for his 5 highestpaid years preceding dissolution was $24,000, Mrs. DeRevere's interest would be:
40
W X $24,000 = $4800 per year, or $400 per month.
200
No such formula is necessary with respect to contributory plans, because the contributions themselves provide the most direct measure of all interests.
99. Rustad v. Rustad, 61 Wn. 2d 176, 377 P.2d 414 (1963); Colpe v. Lindblom,
57 Wash. 106, 106 P. 634 (1910).
100. Until recently the conflicts problem had been confronted in only one
reported decision, Otto v. Otto, 80 N.M. 331, 455 P.2d 642 (1969), in which the
New Mexico Supreme Court remanded for a specific finding as to the parties' domicile
while the military retired pay was being earned. In 1974 a Texas appellate court
recognized that only the portion of military retired pay earned during marriage while
the husband and wife resided in community property states was community property,
those benefits earned in noncommunity property states during marriage being the
separate property of the employee spouse. Mitchim v. Mitchim, 509 S.W.2d 720
(Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
In California, the choice of law problem may be avoided by the quasi-community
property concept which effectively regards that property as community which would
have been so classified had it been acquired in California. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 4803
(West Supp. 1974).
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iary law is the same as our own."' o That presumption undoubtedly
derives from a strong policy preference for community property 102
and a judicial desire to avoid the complexities of determining a service person's domicile(s). 103 But the comparative paucity of community
property jurisdictions' 0 4 and the universal awareness of service persons' transience-the principal factor giving rise to domiciliary
complexities-make the application of the Colpe presumption to military retired pay dispositions naive to the point of abusing the fiction.' 0"5 In the absence of sufficient evidence as to domicile, a better
presumption would be that domicile was consistently coincident with
06
the service person's duty station throughout the military career.
101. 57 Wash. 106, 114, 106 P. 634, 637 (1910), explained in Snyder v. Stringer,
116 Wash. 131, 198 P. 733 (1921).
102. Yesler v. Hochstettler, 4 Wash. 349. 30 P. 398 (1892).
103. A discussion of service persons' domiciles is beyond the scope of this note.
A reader unfamiliar with the peculiar problems involved might profitably refer to the
following cases and commentaries: Thomas v. Thomas. 58 Wn. 2d 377. 363 P.2d
107 (1961); Fiske v. Fiske, 48 Wn. 2d 69, 290 P.2d 725 (1955); Kankelborg v.
Kankelborg, 199 Wash. 259, 90 P.2d 1018 (1939); Sanftner, The Serviceman's Legal
Residence: Some Practical Suggestions, 26 JAG J. 87 (1971); Thames, Domicile of
Servicemen, 34 Miss. LJ. 160 (1963); Comment, Domicile of Members of Armed
Forces, 26 TENN. L. REV. 415 (1959).
104. The community property jurisdictions (Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana.
Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Washington) represent 16% of the states. The
cumulative population of these eight states includes the same proportion of living
veterans as their cumulative population bears to the total population of the United
States-21%. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 13, 275 (94th ed. 1973).

105. The New Mexico Supreme Court avoided the automatic, unquestioning
application of any Colpe-like presumption in Otto v. Otto, 80 N.M. 331, 455 P.2d 642.
643 (1969):
[I]t is by no means clear from [the serviceman's] testimony where the
parties were domiciled during the greater part of the coverture and for what
period of time. Findings may not rest upon mere speculation and conjecture.
106. By reference to the service record, the service person's history of duty
stations is readily ascertainable, while domicile may not be. Temporary deployments
outside the United States could be ignored, since the portion of military retired pay
earned during such deployment would continue to be characterized under the laws
of the home port or permanent duty station. During permanent overseas assignments.
the law of the last previous stateside station could control; but the forum could
hardly be excoriated if it chose to fill these gaps by applying its own law. This presumption, admittedly arbitrary, is less so than the one being criticized, because
greater effect is given to the realities of each case. Additionally. this presumption
avoids the opposite extreme results of the Colpe presumption and of a concession of
persisting noncommunity property domicile based on the service person's recollection
of his or her animus manendi-an improvement if that memory might be influenced
by a realization of the consequences.
That a service person may have both lived and worked on a federal military
reservation while stationed within a particular state should not operate to avoid the
effect of that state's laws. Cf. Makah Indian Tribe v. Clallam County, 73 Wn. 2d 677.
440 P.2d 442 (1968).
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3.

Application by the dissolution court

Thus, the only information needed by the court to determine the
various interests in the military retired pay is: (1) the service person's
grade at dissolution; and (2) the number of years during which marriage and service coincided in a community property jurisdiction. The
community's interest is one-fortieth of the latter times the base pay of
the former; 10 7 the other spouse's interest is one-half of the community's; 10 8 and the service person's share, by deduction, is the retired
pay actually received less that portion to which the other spouse is entitled. 09
Once the court has determined the predissolution property interests
of the parties, it should then be prepared to exercise properly its considerable discretion in ordering a disposition appropriate to the facts
of the case.
V.

WHAT DISPOSITION OF MILITARY RETIRED PAY IS
APPROPRIATE?

A.

General Equity Power of Washington Courts

The disposition of military retired pay as property" 0 need not conform to the predissolution interests of the parties;' 1 indeed, the trial
107. The court's determination of the parties' predissolution interests should be
expressed in terms corresponding to the method of disposition chosen. See Part V
infra. If one spouse is awarded a fractional share to be received concurrently with
the government's military retired payments to the other, the predissolution interests
and disposition can be expressed just as they are in the text. If one spouse is to receive a lump sum, or an award of other property in lieu thereof, his or her predissolution interest should be expressed by the court in terms of a lump sum estimate,
discounted for the uncertainty of eventual retirement and further reduced to an
actuarial dissolution-date value. These factors are discussed more fully in the next
section.
108. It is important to notice that the wife's ownership and possession in half
of these earnings and gains during marriage passed to her automatically ipsojure
without the necessity of delivery. And her ownership and possession in half of
these earnings and gains did not depend upon any mere physical fact of placing
the earnings or gains in the husband's hands but related, just as the husband's
ownership did, to the very inception of the right to such earnings and gains.
W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 66, at 142 (2d
ed. 1971).
109. Note that the service person's portion is composed of one-half of the community interest, plus any separate share. The community share will, of course, be
identical to the other spouse's; any separate share will be based upon the actual
retired grade and length of total service.
110. If the court has determined, by whatever rule or reason, that military
retired pay is not property, the service person will necessarily retain whatever interest

529

Washington Law Review

Vol. 50: 505, 1975

court has wide discretion with respect to the disposition of any particular asset,' 1 2 so long as the resulting distribution of community and
separate property comports with the statutory standards of justice and
equity.1 13 Division along the lines of the parties' predissolution interor expectancy exists with respect to the benefits. The court will be concerned with the
retired pay only as it might bear on one spouse's ability to afford maintenance
(alimony) payments to the other whose circumstances justify such an award. See
Morse v. Morse, 42 Wn. 2d 229, 254 P.2d 720 (1953); Holland v. Holland. 139
Wash. 424, 247 P. 455 (1926); Mose v. Mose, 4 Wn. App. 204, 480 P.2d 517 (1971).
11. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080 (Supp. 1973). By contrast, the courts of
Canada (a common law jurisdiction) are required to identify and preserve the parties'
predissolution interests. Murdoch v. Murdoch, [ 1974] 1 W.W.R. 361 (Can. 1973).
112. See notes 84-87 and accompanying text supra. It might persuasively be
argued that deference to federal supremacy, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cf. 2, imposes
limitations upon the state court's disposition of military retired pay that do not exist
with respect to other property. Judge B. Abbott Goldberg has contended emphatically
that state action in this sphere is not merely limited, but precluded. He insists that
because military retired pay is a federally created benefit, rights therein are not
susceptible of interpretation under state law unless that state law has been adopted
by Congress or the federal courts. Noting that. "[nlothing has been found to
indicate that Congress has ever considered treating retired pay as community
property," the Judge's interpretation of Congressional intent led him to conclude
"that retired pay is indeed a personal entitlement of the retiree, which accrues only
to him, and in which his wife has no rights except as Congress gives them to her."
Goldberg. Is Armed Services Retired Pay Really Community' Property? 48 CAL.
ST. B.J. 13, 91 (1973). In Fithian v. Fithian, l0 Cal. 3d 592. 517 P.2d 449. I1
Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974), the California Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to
consider Judge Goldberg's analysis and rejected his view of two prior decisions in
which the United States Supreme Court examined rights in other federal benefitsFree v. Bland, 369 U.S. 633 (1962) (U.S. Savings Bonds), and Wissner v. Wissner.
338 U.S. 655 (1950) (National Service Life Insurance). According to the California
court, "Free and Wissner make clear, however, that state law may determine the
treatment accorded locally to a federally created property right so long as the result
does not frustrate the express or implied purposes of the federal legislation." 517 P.2d
at 452 n.4, Ill Cal. Rptr. at 372 n.4. See also In re Marriage of Milhan. 13 Cal. 3d
129, 528 P.2d 1145. 117 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1974).
A state court which awards to the nonearning spouse at dissolution a lump sum
or other property in lieu of his or her interest in military retired pay-or even one
which awards only a predissolution share of that benefit-would appear not to thwart
the apparent Congressional purpose of improving the morale and increasing the
retention of service personnel. That "substantial interest" of the federal government
might well "suffer major damage" (United States v. Yazell. 382 U.S. 341. 352( 19661).
however, if the state court presumes to award the nonearning spouse a percentage
or dollar amount in excess of his or her predissolution interest in each retired pay
check. The state court decisions mentioned earlier in this footnote have not discussed
this distinction, but have treated the entire federal benefit as being properly before
the dissolution court for characterization and disposition.
The most effective resolution of the supremacy issue would result from Congressional clarification; a welcome alternative would be an answer from the Supreme
Court. which has thus far declined to speak. House v. House, Civil No. 11106 (Cal.
Ct. App. 4th Dist., June 13, 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1118 (1973); Dominey v.
Dominey. 481 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1028 (1972).
113. See Roach v. Roach, 72 Wn. 2d 144, 149, 432 P.2d 579, 582 (1967).
Similarly wide discretion is vested in Texas courts. TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.63 (Supp.
1973). Other jurisdictions require an equal division of community property. CAL.
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ests may be desirable in come cases; in every case it is a rational
starting point 14 from which to make any adjustments necessary to
account for the "economic circumstances of each spouse."' 15 For
example, when one spouse's needs cannot be met by his or her actual
or potential income and predissolution share of the property, the court
has the power to award that spouse additional property that would
otherwise have gone to the spouse whose economic circumstances are
superior. Additionally, or alternatively, the court can award maintenance (alimony) to the spouse in need from the spouse whose income
is sufficient to provide it.1 16 Frequently, even where alteration of the
aggregate interests of each spouse is not required because of economic
circumstances, the court will reallocate particular items of property so
that some assets will be owned entirely by one spouse, while offsetting
11 7
property is awarded in toto to the other.
B.

ConsiderationsBearing Upon Disposition

The difficult task of disposition 18 encompasses two discrete but
concomitant functions: (1) division of the military retired pay into the
portions to be awarded each party; and (2) selection of the most appropriate method of distributing those portions. Disposition of retired
pay-as of property generally-should be considered, not in isolation, but rather in combination with other aspects of the parties' circumstances,11 9 including:
CiV. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1973); Michelson v. Michelson, 86 N.M. 107,
520 P.2d 263 (1974).
114. Where both spouses are capable of supporting themselves, a decree which

preserves predissolution interests may well be appropriate. In any event, preliminary
sorting of the parties' property according to such interests--instead of initially
aggregating all community and separate property-will provide to the judge a

keener appreciation for the extent of the transfers being effected by a decree which
alters those interests.
115.
116.

WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080(4) (Supp. 1973).
See notes 134-35 and accompanying text izfra.

117.

Washington courts have generally preferred such a "clean break" to a scheme

of distribution which would leave former spouses as co-owners of tangible or real
property. See, e.g., Bernier v. Bernier, 44 Wn. 2d 447, 267 P.2d 1066 (1954).

118. It is always a difficult task for the trial court to follow the mandate of the
statute . . . to make the property division just and equitable, having regard for
the statutory factors to be taken into consideration. It is manifestly more difficult

when one of those [the disposable] items of property has not yet come into
being, and, when once it does come into existence, has an unpredictable life.
DeRevere v. DeRevere, 5 Wn. App. 741, 746, 491 P.2d 249, 253 (1971).
119. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080 (Supp. 1973). See, e.g., Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wn. 2d 293, 494 P.2d 208 (1972); DeRuwe v. DeRuwe, 72 Wn. 2d 404,
433 P.2d 209 (1967).
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(1) value of the retired pay;
(2) predissolution interests of each party in the retired pay;
(3) proximity of dissolution to the time of actual retirement or eligibility therefor;
(4) value, kind, source, date of acquisition, and community or separate character of other property of the parties;
(5) future earnings prospects of each party (and perhaps children),
as indicated by age, health, education and employment history;
(6) economic norms (standard of living) and needs of each party
(and their children); and
2 0°
(7) gift, estate and income tax consequences.
In addition to these general considerations, a court disposing of future interests should weigh several other factors:
(8) exactitude of alternative methods of distribution, i.e., tendency
for the result of the parties' full compliance with the decree to
conform to the division which the court determined to be
appropriate;
(9) finality of alternative methods of distribution, i.e., the unlikelihood that the court will be called upon at a later time to assist
either party in enforcing the decree; and
(10) enforceability of alternative methods of distribution.
C.

Alternative Methods of Disposition

Based upon the particular pattern described by all of the factors in
each case, the court can choose the most just and equitable method of
distributing a spouse's share of retired pay from among several alternatives, which can be conveniently grouped according to time of enjoyment as follows: (1) distribution only as the retired pay is actually
received by the service person (e.g., the other spouse is awarded a
percentage, fraction or dollar amount of each monthly check payable
if, as and when received by the service person); and (2) distribution
independent of pay actually received (e.g., the other spouse is
awarded the dissolution-date value of his or her portion in a lump sum
or installments, or, in lieu, is awarded other property of equivalent

120. See Hjorth, Community Property Marital Settlements: The Problem and a
Proposal, 50 WASH. L. REV. 231 (1975).
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value). The influence of the enumerated factors on the choice of disposition must be assessed by considering the alternatives individually.
Many courts have decreed that a service person should pay to a
former spouse a certain percentage or fraction of each retired paycheck when it is received. 12 1 The perfect conformity between the division sought by the court and that accomplished by compliance with
the decree cause this method to be unsurpassed in exactitude. Since
the service person's present duty to pay does not arise until benefits are
actually received, this method is particularly appropriate when the
parties have little other property which might be awarded in lieu of an
interest in the retired pay. Where the court determines a spouse's portion of the military retired pay to be small, the similarly small amount
of property needed to substitute for a percentage share is more likely
to be available; under those circumstances the relative inconvenience
of continuing payments might well cause a court to reject this method.
Considerations of finality and enforceability also might encourage a
court to seek another alternative, especially if the service person will
not begin to receive retired pay until many years after the dissolu2
tion. 12
The observations of the previous paragraph also apply to an award
of a specific dollar amount of each month's retired pay, although the
exactitude will be slightly diminished by the deviation from the court's
intended division when (as is probable) the amount paid to the service
person is periodically increased to account for inflation (sometimes

121.

See, e.g., California, New Mexico and Texas cases cited in notes 94-96 supra.

122.

Despite a service person's move from the jurisdiction granting dissolution, a

former spouse can use the military locator services to ascertain his or her whereabouts.
See Comment, The Illegitimate Children and ParentalRights Act, 49 WASH. L. Rev.

647, 676-77 n.123 (1974). Location of the service person by no means insures recovery,
however, for the retirement pay may not be attached or garnished whether the former
spouse claims a property interest in military retired pay, see Arnold v. United States,
331 F. Supp. 42 (S.D. Tex. 1971), or attempts to enforce an alimony award. See
Applegate v. Applegate, 39 F. Supp. 887, 889-90 (E.D. Va. 1941); cf. Buchanan

v. Alexander, 45 U.S. 20 (1846). Nor is contempt a proper remedy to enforce property settlements which are unrelated to a duty to support spouse or children. Decker
v. Decker, 52 Wn. 2d 456, 326 P.2d 332 (1958). But cf. Brantley v. Brantley, 54
Wn. 2d 717, 344 P.2d 731 (1959), where the court held imprisonment for contempt
(under WASH. REV. CODE § 7.20.110 (1963)) to be constitutional as punishment

for a spouse's failure to pay a community debt in accordance with the divorce
court's decree, where the ordered payment bears a reasonable relationship to the
spouse's support obligations. Such a relationship frequently would be more easily

established with respect to payments-however labeled-from one spouse to the other
than to payments to a third party creditor.

533

Washington Law Review

Vol. 50: 505, 1975

called a "cost-of-living increase"), while the other spouse's dollar
amount remains fixed. For example, Mrs. Payne's award will continue
to be $65 ten-plus years from now, while the total retired pay received
1 23
If
by Mr. Payne may have increased from $360 to $500 or more.
by awarding $65 of the total $360, the court intended Mrs. Payne's
share to be 18 percent of the retired pay, that intent will be frustrated
in direct proportion to subsequent statutory increases or decreases in

military base pay rates.
The circumstances of some parties might lead the court to award all
the retired pay to the service person, with an award to the other
spouse of cash or other property of a value equivalent to the interest
in the retired pay which would otherwise be received. This method of
disposition is obviously limited to those cases involving parties who
have accumulated sufficient assets from which to make such an
award. 12 4 The attractiveness of this method is further reduced by the
lack of exactitude inherent when the award must be based upon an
estimate at the time of dissolution of the value of benefits the service
person may eventually receive-such value to be adjusted for the statistical probability of any receipt 12 5 and the actuarial estimation of
duration of receipt,12 6 further discounted for taxes saved 127 and acceleration of the time of enjoyment.1 28 Against these disadvantages, a

123. See text accompanying note I stupra.
124. See, e.g., Weiss v. Weiss, 75 Wn. 2d 596, 452 P.2d 748 (1969). which
involved four different retirement plans of parties whose total assets were over
$160,000.
125. The military services have collected data. used to generate personnel continuation rates, from which can readily be computed the probability that a person with
a known length of service will complete the 20 years of service generally required to
qualify for retirement. These data account for attrition resulting from all causes.
including death, disability, desertion and voluntary separation from the military service.
Telephone interview with Commander Stevenson, Bureau of Naval Personnel
(PERS 212). Department of the Navy, Washington. D.C.. Jan. 8, 1975.
126.
See, e.g., Treas. Reg § 1.72-9 (1957).
127. Where a spouse is granted a lump sum at dissolution, and the award was
part of an equal division, it would not be subject to tax: in all probability, the service
person would be taxed on the entire amount of retired pay as received. See Hjorth.
Community Property Marital Settlements: The Problem and a Proposal, 50 WASH.
L. REv. 231 (1975).
128. For an example which accounts for some of these factors in estimating the
divorce-date value of such an interest, see Brief for Respondent at 9-10. Weiss v.
Weiss, 75 Wn. 2d 596, 452 P.2d 748 (1969). It should be noted, however, that no
degree of care or refinement of calculation can eliminate the potential for inequity
inherent even in such sophisticated guesswork.
The greatest disparity between the court's intended division and the actual result
would occur if. after such a lump sum or property award to one spouse at the time
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court must weigh the greater finality and enforceability of this
method. Immediate disposition is understandably attractive to a court
eager to free itself and the receiving spouse from continuing concern
129
as to the service person's dependability and whereabouts.
D.

The Maintenance Alternative

To complement the comparison of alternative methods by which to
distribute military retired pay as property, one should consider the
alternative to property dispositions in general. Should a court adopt a
rule of vesting by which retired pay would not be recognized as property distributable at dissolution, the only other means by which the
nonearning spouse might share in that benefit is an award of maintenance. A maintenance award-in contrast to distribution as property
1 30
-lacks immutability; i.e., it is susceptible to later modification.
Maintenance also lacks finality, but it affords a spouse greater en3
forceability than does an award of property.' '

of dissolution, the other died before receiving any (or a substantial amount) of the
retired pay upon which the award was based. See generally Wise, Those Uncertain
Actuaries (parts 1-2), FORTUNE, Dec. 1965, at 154 & Jan. 1966, at 164, cited in
Hughes, Community-Property Aspects of Profit-Sharingand Pension Plans in Texas,
44 TEX. L. REV. 860, 879 (1966). Despite its inexactitude and limited applicability,
this method of disposition was recommended (presumably because of its finality) in
Riddell, supra note 3, at 2.
129. It is much harder to perceive why a court would order a husband who is
not yet retired to make monthly installment payments in an amount determined by a
compound approximation similar to that just described, thus sacrificing finality and
enforceability without gaining in exactitude. Yet, just such an award was affirmed on
appeal in Bensing v. Bensing, 25 Cal. App. 3d 889, 102 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1972)
(military retired pay), and in DeRevere v. DeRevere, 5 Wn. App. 741, 491 P.2d
249, rehearing5 Wn. App. 446, 488 P.2d 763 (1971) (corporate retirement plan).
Where the needs of one spouse dictate present payment, but the other's resources
are insufficient to warrant a lump sum award, an award of maintenance would be
more practical and equitable than a pre-retirement installment award of property as
in DeRevere.
130.

WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.170 (Supp. 1973) provides in part:

[Except as provided in a separation contract,] the provisions of any decree respecting maintenance or support may be modified only as to installments accruing
subsequent to the motion for modification and only upon a showing of a substantial change of circumstances. The provisions as to property disposition may
not be revoked or modified, unless the court finds the existence of conditions that
justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state.
Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 26.08.110 (1963), quoted at note 10 supra. See
McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 43 Wn. 2d 111, 260 P.2d 875 (1953).
131. One spouse may enforce a maintenance award through contempt proceedings, In re Cave, 26 Wash. 213, 66 P. 425 (1901), even where the other's only
income and assets are derived from a federal pensi6n. Gerold v. Gerold, 6 Ore. App.
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It is meaningless to speak of exactitude with respect to maintenance, which is not based on a predissolution interest in retired pay
and does not represent a postdissolution property interest therein; instead, the amount of maintenance is based upon one spouse's need
and the other's ability to pay.' 32 The extent to which that ability is
increased by the service person's receipt of military retired pay is the
only connection between the retired pay and the maintenance, which
bears no necessary or probable relation to the other spouse's contribution to the service career. 33 Taken together with Washington's policy

against permanent maintenance, 134 the above reasons strongly suggest
that maintenance should not be decreed as a substitute for a property
interest in retired pay, but only as an additional award in appropriate
35
circumstances.'
353, 488 P.2d 294 (1971). If the service person can still be found in Washington.
the other spouse may also choose from additional enforcement mechanisms available
under WASH.

REV.

CODE ch. 26.20 (Supp. 1973).

Moreover, several

mechanisms

exist for reciprocal interstate enforcement of support. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE
ch. 26.21 (Supp. 1973). See generally Diaz. Pursuing the Elusive Nonsupporting
Serviceman, 14 JAG L. REV. 123 (1973). Compare the greater enforcement problems
associated with property settlements, note 122 supra.
132. See Kelso v. Kelso, 75 Wn. 2d 24, 448 P.2d 449 (1968); Endres v. Endres.
62 Wn. 2d 55, 380 P.2d 873 (1963). Compare WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.09.090 (Supp.
1973) with 26.08.110 (1963).
133. In fact. the service person's ability to afford maintenance will decrease
upon retirement from the service unless he or she compensates for the disparity
between former active duty pay and retired pay by obtaining civilian employment.
134. See Berg v. Berg, 72 Wn. 2d 532, 434 P.2d 1 (1967). But where the parties
settle their affairs by means of a separation contract instead of leaving that task to
the court, then permanence, immutability, control over the consequence, and greater
enforceability can be made attributes of a maintenance award, which might thereby
become more advantageous to both spouses than a division of retired pay as property.
See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.070 (Supp. 1973); Rieke, The Dissolution Act of 1973:
From Status to Contract?, 49 WASH. L. REV. 375, 398-99 (1974). The remarks of a
Texas practitioner apply to contractual alimony in Washington as well. Vetter,
Commmuity Property Divorce-a View from Texas, I COMMUNITY PROPERTY J.
67, 69 (1974).
135. It is essential that the court clearly articulate its disposition of military
retired pay even when it is being awarded entirely to the service person with an
additional award of maintenance to the other spouse. The Texas Supreme Court.
deciding a partition case involving military disability retirement pay not disposed of
at the time of divorce, admonished:
In the future, counsel for litigants in divorce suits should call to the attention of
the trial judge all of the assets of the marriage. . . . [T] he trial judges of the
state, sitting in divorce suits, should inquire as to the existence of insurance or
retirement programs to the end that the final judgment fully disposes of all
property valuables of the community.
Busby v. Busby. 457 S.W.2d 551, 555 (Tex. 1970). Property not disposed of by
the dissolution court vests equally in the former spouses as tenants in common and
may well precipitate further litigation. Cf. Chase v. Chase, 74 Wn. 2d 253. 444 P.2d
145 (1968); Pittman v. Pittman, 64Wn. 2d 735, 393 P.2d 957 (1964).
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E.

Fashioningthe Award of Military Retired Pay

In summary, the court must determine the division of property interests in military retired pay and the method of disposition based
upon a combination of factors related not only to the retired pay itself, but also to the parties' other property, income and economic
needs. In choosing its method of disposition, the court faces a dilemma born of the divergent demands of equity and security. The division desired by the court will be most nearly achieved by the parties'
full compliance with an award which delays the other spouse's receipt
of an interest in retired pay to coincide with the service person's enjoyment. By contrast, finality and enforceability are enhanced by an
award which provides for the receipt of the other spouse's interest as
early as possible, thereby increasing the probability that full compliance will occur. Only by resolving this conflict will the court properly
fulfill its minimal obligation to decree who should receive what, and
how. The culmination of the court's efforts should be an explicit
articulation of the following:
(1) who is awarded an interest in the military retired pay (husband,
wife or both);
(2) the nature of each interest awarded (property or maintenance);
(3) the exact extent of each interest (in dollars, or a percentage or
fraction of some specified, ascertainable reference-e.g., base
pay or retired pay of a particular grade as of a particular time);
(4) when the nonearning spouse should receive an interest (if at one
time only; otherwise when periodic payments are to begine.g., by date or relative to the service person's receipt 6f
retired pay);
(5) conditions which terminate payments from one spouse to the
other (e.g., upon the death of the first to die, or when the
service person is no longer receiving retired pay); 136
136.

This note is regrettably not an adequate vehicle for the consideration due

the significant peripheral issue of disposition of the former spouse's interest at his or

her death. An award of all retired pay to the service person with property to the

other spouse in lieu of his or her interest will avoid this problem (as will an immediate lump sum cash payment). The court can also resolve the question by expressly
providing for termination of the other spouse's interest upon the death of either.
See Fithian v. Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974);
Bensing v. Bensing, 25 Cal. App. 3d 889, 102 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1972); cf. Waite v.

Waite, 17 Cal. App. 3d 108, 94 Cal. Rptr. 677 (1971). That the Washington court
should so provide seems justifiable in terms of both equity and expediency.
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(6) who is to pay taxes on each interest;137
(7) whether the decree is an adjudication of an amount owing or
38
an order to pay.'
VI.

CONCLUSION

Prior to the decision in Payne v. Payne, the Washington Supreme
Court had subjected military retired pay in dissolution (divorce) cases
to inconsistent treatment. Each of the earlier cases involved a service
person who already was receiving retired pay at the time of dissolution; none contained an analysis comprehensive enough to resolve the
primary issue or underlying problems in Payne. Nevertheless, in
Payne-involving a serviceman not yet retired at dissolution-the
court assumed that the retired pay was property of some undetermined character and that as such, an interest in it could be awarded
to the wife without regard for the extent of the previous community or
separate interests therein. The result was a property award of $65 per
month for Mrs. Payne, and a regrettable lack of guidance for courts,
counsel and couples.
The court should have addressed three principal questions:
(1) Is military retired pay property?
Suggested Conclusion: Yes. As between the service person and anyone
39
but the federal government, a right to military retired pay vests'
upon entry into the service.

137. See Riddell, supra note 3, at 2. The California Supreme Court recently
refused to accept the net amount of military retired pay. after deduction of federal
income tax, as the proper amount to be used in determining the wife's share of
benefits earned by her serviceman-husband. According to the California court. "The
respondent [wife] having been declared owner of a percentage of the pension rights
as her share of the community property will presumably pay income taxes on the
amount she receives." In re Wilson's Marriage. 10 Cal. '3d 851, 856, 519 P.2d 165,
168, 112 Cal. Rptr. 405, 408 (1974).
138. This distinction may make a difference in the enforceability, through contempt and imprisonment, of the dissolution court's awards. See Brantley v. Brantley.
54Wn. 2d 717, 344 P.2d 731 (1959).
139. Recall the difference between vesting and maturing: "vesting" is once again
used as defined in note 53 supra. Federal courts have recognized that a person's
right to a federal statutory benefit may be vested as between that person and any
other individual although it is not as between that person and the federal government. See Knapp v. Alexander-Edgar Lumber Co., 237 US. 162 t1915): United
States v. Buchanan. 232 U.S. 72 (1914): United States v. 10,245 Acres of Land.
50 F. Supp. 470 (E.D. Wash. 1943).
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(2) To what extent is military retired pay community property?
Suggested Conclusion: The community has a predissolution interest in
the retired pay equal to one-fortieth of the service person's base pay at
dissolution grade times the number of years during which the parties'
marriage coincided with military service in a community property jurisdiction.
(3) What disposition of the military retired pay is just and equitable
in Payne?
Suggested Conclusion:Although the opinion reveals insufficient information regarding the parties economic circumstances for a well-informed appraisal, the division and method of disposition chosen appear to be appropriate, and are certainly well within the discretion of
the court. A more effective and comprehensive decree, however, could
have been expressed in terms of a percentage (in this case, nine per
cent) of the base pay corresponding to the serviceman's pay grade at
dissolution, and should have included specific provisions for payment
of taxes, termination of the serviceman's obligation and other matters
identified herein.
The above italicized responses are labeled "conclusions" rather
than "answers," because competent answers by the court to these
questions and other ancillary problems discussed in this note would
require thorough analysis of a scope and depth (and consequently,
length) far exceeding that of the Payne opinion. Once such a comprehensive approach is judicially adopted, however, its application to
other cases can be accomplished readily in an opinion as compact as
that in Payne. More importantly, future parties may be able to assume
much of the burden of subsequent application if the adopting court's
treatment is both sound in its reasoning and clear in its articulation.
The treatment in Payne was neither.
D. Michael Young
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